Publications

(2020). Making Sense of Non-factual Disagreement in Science. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science Part A.

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(2019). Models on the Move: Migration and Imperialism. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science A, 77, 81–92.

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(2019). Aggregating Belief Models. Proceedings of Machine Learning Research.

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(2019). A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories. Theoria 85:1 18–30.

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(2019). Imprecise Probabilities. Computer Simulation Validation (2019, Springer) Claus Beisbart and Nicole Saam (eds).

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(2018). Modelling Inequality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 69:3 691–718.

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(2017). Constraints on rational theory choice. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68:3 617–638.

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(2017). Are Objective Chances Compatible with Determinism. Philosophy Compass.

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(2017). Nonclassical probability and convex hulls. Erkenntnis, 82:1 87–101.

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(2016). Imprecise Probabilities. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

(2016). Vague Chance. Ergo.

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(2016). Can free evidence be bad?: Value of information for the imprecise probabilist. Philosophy of Science, 83:1 1–28.

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(2015). How to choose among choice functions. Proceedings of ISIPTA 2015.

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(2014). Uncertainty, learning, and the 'problem' of dilation. Erkenntnis, 79:6 1287–1303.

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(2014). Should subjective probabilities be sharp?. Episteme, 11:3 277–289.

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(2014). Laplace's Demon and the adventures of his apprentice. Philosophy of Science 81:1 31–59.

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