This paper has two goals.
The first goal is to say something about how one might combine different agents' imprecise probabilities
to generate an aggregate imprecise probability.
The second goal is to champion the very general theory of "belief …

There is currently much discussion about how decision making should proceed when an
agent's degrees of belief are imprecise; represented by a set of probability functions.
I show that decision rules recently discussed by
Sarah Moss, Susanna Rinard …

This project explores Imprecise probabilities as a model for rational belief.

This paper has two goals. The first goal is to say some thing about how one might combine different agents' imprecise probabilities to generate an aggregate imprecise probability. The second goal is to champion the very general theory of "belief …

This paper has two goals. The first goal is to say some thing about how one might combine different agents' imprecise probabilities to generate an aggregate imprecise probability. The second goal is to champion the very general theory of "belief …

This paper has two goals. The first goal is to say some thing about how one might combine different agents' imprecise probabilities to generate an aggregate imprecise probability. The second goal is to champion the very general theory of "belief …

It is well known that the convex hull of the classical truth value functions contains all and only the probability functions. Work by Paris and Williams has shown that this also holds for various kinds of nonclassical logics too. This note summarises …

It has been argued that imprecise probabilities are a natural and intuitive way of overcoming some of the issues with orthodox precise probabilities. Models of this type have a long pedigree, and interest in such models has been growing in recent …

This paper considers a puzzling conflict between
two positions that are each
compelling: (A) it is irrational for an agent to pay to avoid 'free' evidence
before making a decision, and (B) rational agents may have *imprecise*
beliefs and/or desires. …

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