Here’s a first post in my series on indeterminate credence. My first topic is what has sometimes been called the Clifford–James debate. W.K. Clifford and William James had different views about what the aim of belief was. I argue that if one sides with Clifford over James, then indeterminate credence is reasonable.
This is the first of a series of posts I am going to write as a way to get together my thoughts for a new paper. An early version of this stuff appeared in my thesis, so I already have a pretty good idea what I’m going to be writing about. The paper is ultimately going to be about indeterminate credence. I think there are plenty of disparate reasons for perhaps wanting to take imprecise or indeterminate credence seriously, so I’m going to write a paper outlining them all.
So I carved off a short section of my thesis and tidied it up into a little paper on Roger White’s coin puzzle for imprecise credences. If you like that sort of thing, you can find the paper over here (PDF). Comments welcome! By email, or by twitter if you’re hip and modern. And your comment is less than 140 characters.
I’m not going to summarise the paper here because it’s only 6 pages long, and you might as well just read it!
I’ve been thinking about rationality requirements for sequences of choices. It seems there’s a sense in which some synchronic (static) norms are justified by related diachronic (dynamic) norms. I recently hit an interesting snag in this picture.
Flicking through the “my clippings” thing on my kindle for my Chandler quotes post, I realised that I have many gems from Russell’s History of Western Philosophy also saved on there. Again, this reflects more on what I find amusing than on what Russell wrote or thought. While we’re on the subject of Russell, Jorge Luis Borges, in an article about Zeno’s paradox describes Russell as “inhumanly lucid”.
I recently read some Raymond Chandler books on kindle. The Big Sleep, Farewell My Lovely and The Long Goodbye, if you’re interested. Here are some bits of those books I felt compelled to highlight as I was reading. This probably tells you more about me than it does about Chandler.
Here’s a thing I noticed recently during an interesting reading group discussion here at MCMP. Disagreement is intensional. We can disagree about whether Superman is in the room, even if we agree that Clark Kent is in the room. I’m not sure whether this has been noticed, or whether it has any interesting consequences, but it seemed an interesting fact.
There seems to be a tension between some putative norms of epistemology. On the one hand, you are required to believe things you have evidence for. On the other hand, you are normatively compelled to believe all the logical truths. But you have no evidence for most logical truths. What to make of this puzzle?
Here’s a post that’s actually about philosophy. The basic idea is that there seem to be lots of different kinds of “measures on events” that we can think about. There are credences, there are chance functions, and there are others (about which more later). I just want to try and identify and distinguish some of these.